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Economic methodologists have observed that economists do not
practice what they think their methodology is. Two positions follow from
this. One insists on the need for ‘better’ practice in maintaining ‘scientific’
standard, while the other takes the literary turn. Following the second
route we argue that appraisal of economic theories cannot be done by
applying a general ‘scientific method’ apart from practice.
Methodological conversations, which are shaped by various strategies
taken by practitioners to persuade each other, can only be studied and
improved by reading the most persuasive of the authors in the discipline.
Writings of Albert Hirschman and Amartya Sen are chosen to be read
following our approach.
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Introduction
It now sounds odd that methodological debates within the
economics profession in fact originated from a naive notion that
methodology would tell us how to do economics scientifically.  In the
good old days of ‘economic science’, philosophers of science were
believed to hold the key to how to do economics, even though certain
groups outside of the mainstream economics (eg. Marxists, Austrians,
Institutionalists) were seen following their respective methodological
approaches that shared the view that methodology would provide a
framework for launching fundamental critique of mainstream practice.
What is common among the practitioners both within and outside of the
mainstream is that both the groups have so far viewed methodology as
offering a set of prescriptions concerning legitimate (‘scientific’ or
‘social-scientific’) practice.  For them, the enterprise of methodology is
therefore essentially normative, and based on philosophers’ attempts to
justify knowledge claims.  It is this notion of methodology that is critically
reflected upon in this paper.  From the title it may appear that our intention
is to further strengthen the widely-held position that denigrates any
explicit methodological analysis and commentary within contemporary
mainstream economics1.  It will become evident that this is not what
‘irrelevance of methodology’ is supposed to convey.
1 It is often said that those who can, do, while those who cannot, discuss
methodology. The whole enterprise of methodology is seen by many as something
that can only divert attention from the real task of a social scientist, namely to
solve substantial problems. Interestingly, many of the practising economists in
India, who are ever so ready to dismiss contemporary western mainstream
economics, share this view with the latter.4
Methodology (with capital ‘M’)
We begin with a useful distinction between two senses in which
the word methodology may be used2.  By Methodology (with capital
‘M’) we shall mean the normative enterprise of judging theories from a
meta-theoretic position.  Economists, who believe that claims about
economic knowledge have no less epistemic status than claims about
physical or biological phenomena, are positivists in the sense that they
believe there is a universal framework in which all ‘scientific’ knowledge
claims may be justified.  This view of Methodology is quite different
from the methodological (with small ‘m’) discourse that practising
economists often engage in. Economists do not only construct models
and conduct empirical tests, they also argue on what a good model should
look like (Klamer, 1983, p238). These small methodological
conversations lead to acceptance of certain arguments and rejection of
others. But what is important is that it is impossible to know beforehand
which arguments will prevail in the end.
While small methodological conversations are what economists
do in seminars and conferences, Methodological pronouncements do
not seem to have had much influence on what economists do. In this
respect economists of mainstream variety are no less guilty than their
friends in the ‘soft’ discipline of development economics.  As a matter
of fact, much of the interesting and influential work of economists would
have to be rejected if we passed judgements on the basis of what
economists believe their Methodology is3.  On this point almost all the
2 This is commonly shared by postpositivist writers like McCloskey, Klamer,
Weintraub and others. This section has drawn heavily on Weintraub (1990).
3 Mark Blaug (1988) examines the work of John. R. Hicks with the aim of
discovering  whether a coherent Methodological position informs Hicks’s writings.
Blaug is unable to find any coherent Methodological stance in Hicks’s work.5
scholars of Methodology, whose positions are otherwise diametrically
opposed to each other, would agree.  Mark Blaug, who still argues in
favour of falsificationism as the Methodological standard, observes that
“economists fail consistently to practise what they preach”.  Following
this observation, while Blaug suggests that economists should try hard
to satisfy the Methodological standard, others find problems inherent in
falsificationist Methodology itself.  In this paper our purpose is not to
replace one Methodology with another.  We rather ask the question: How
sensible is it to hold on to a Methodology that prescribes a universal
standard for assessing the merits of particular theories?  Even when
practising economists are seen engaged in methodological (with small
‘m’) conversations, can we really set a standard of conversation by any
meta-theoretic consideration?  In what follows, a brief account of the
evolution of methodological thinking in economics is presented with
particular emphasis on recent trends against foundationalist thinking,
and then we make an attempt to articulate the view that appraisal of
economic practice is a complex process of questioning and interpreting
that cannot be based on any general “scientific method”.  We argue that
the requirement that arguments ought to follow certain fixed
Methodological principles is rather misconstrued.  We then put forward
the position that methodological conversations, which are shaped by
various strategies taken by practitioners to persuade each other, can only
be studied and improved by reading the most persuasive of the authors
in the discipline.  The purpose here is not to give another clarion call for
an integrated social science.  What is more important is to take a stock of
the building blocks that have already been assembled by practitioners
with a variety of motivations.  This brings us close to the approaches of
economists like Albert Hirschman and Amartya Sen.  As there is no sure
foundation which would provide us a precise judgement about the worth
of a particular piece of work in economics, it would be worthwhile to6
study what economists actually do and not what they should do.  The
rich variety of actual practices of economists can be appreciated by taking
a close look at some of the best practices.  We undertake a study of two
economists, Albert Hirschman and Amartya Sen, who have been quite
successful in attracting and influencing their audiences. In particular,
we attempt to analyse and compare their forms of argument which have
resulted in the different kinds of success that these two writers on
development have achieved, as far as persuasion is concerned.
What mainstream economists believe their Methodology is:
The philosopher who has had the greatest influence on the
Methodology of economics is Karl Popper.  He is often invoked by
economic Methodologists such as Mark Blaug and Terence Hutchison4.
Popper’s philosophy even influenced a major introductory textbook,
Richard Lipsey’s An Introduction to Positive Economics.
Throughout his work Popper has been concerned with what he
calls “the problem of demarcation”, that is, the problem of distinguishing
science from non-science.  Popper’s answer to the problem of
demarcation is that scientific theories are falsifiable. A statement is in
principle falsifiable if it is logically inconsistent with some finite set of
true or false observation reports.  In other words, a theory is falsifiable if
it is not guaranteed that it will pass all tests.  There must be some possible
tests or observations which, if obtained, would be evidence that the theory
is false.  Popper himself gives an example of a scientific statement: “All
swans are white”.  This is a falsifiable statement since the observation of
a non-white swan would establish its falsity (Popper, 1968, p27).  Popper
further refines this basic idea by distinguishing a class of statements
which he calls “basic statements”.  Basic statements are such that we
easily agree upon the truth status of these statements.
4 Blaug (1980, 1992), Hutchison (1938, 1965).7
Popper also emphasises an “asymmetry between verifiability and
falsifiability; an asymmetry which results from the logical form of
universal statements” (Popper, ibid).  A universal statement concerning
an unbounded domain may be falsifiable but it will not be verifiable.
That is, a universal statement is not deducible from any finite set of
basic statements.  For example, the basic statement “this swan is black”
falsifies the universal statement “all swans are white”.  But no set of
observation reports verifies that “all swans are white” or “all swans are
black”.  It is not possible to verify any truly universal statement, but one
can falsify it or verify its negation. (Hausman, 1992, Ch 10).
Blaug (1992) claims that
“modern economists do in fact subscribe to the
methodology of falsificationism: despite some differences
of opinion, particularly about the direct testing of
fundamental assumptions, mainstream economists refuse
to take any economic theory seriously if it does not venture
to make definite predictions about economic events, and
they ultimately judge economic theories in terms of their
success in making accurate predictions” (p xiii).
At the same time he is critical of what economists actually do as
distinct from what they say they do.  Economists, according to him, pay
lip service to notions like empirical content and falsifiability and
deductive testing but do not actually put the Popperian rules for strenuous
testing into practice (ibid).  In other words, Blaug uses Popper’s
Methodological rules to criticise economic practice.
But why Popper? To many economic methodologists, it is Popper
who could salvage the ‘economic science’ by exposing the self-
indulgence of economists who cared little about the empirical world.
This motivated Terence Hutchison in the 1930s to bring Popper’s8
demarcation criterion to the attention of economists. Hutchison’s purpose
was to show how much of what then passed for economic analysis was
tautology masquerading as substantive propositions (de Marchi, 1988,
p7).
These Methodological pronouncements apart, Popper constitutes
a genuine puzzle for economic Methodologists.  Popper’s ideas are often
referred to in disputes on what should be considered as “right practice”,
yet in actual practice deviations are the rule.
Why is falsificationism not practised?
If Popper’s ideas are of genuine value to economists, one would
like to know why they are not being followed in actual practice.   Why
do economists not practise what they preach?  Blaug would say “they
don’t try hard”.  His allegations against economic theorists are that they
rarely formulate their theories in ways which facilitate testing, they carry
out few tests, and they pay little attention to negative results.  No sensible
methodologist -- Popperian or otherwise -- would deny the fact that one
important feature of good science is a serious concern with testing.  Why
then is testing so unimportant to economists?  If it has something to do
with the sociology of scientific practice one has to analyse the lapse in
sociological terms. Although Methodologists like A. W. Coats have
advocated that route, others have responded to the puzzle in a variety of
ways.
Daniel Hausman criticises the “methodological schizophrenia that
is characteristic of contemporary economics, whereby methodological
doctrine and practice regularly contradict one another” (Hausman, 1992).
But he provides a different answer to this puzzle. According to him, this
schizophrenia is a symptom of the unsound philosophical premises
underlying contemporary economic methodology.  Hausman points out
a number of difficulties with Popper’s falsificationism as applied to9
science.  Even if it was free of these difficulties they would be of little or
no value to economists.  One can argue that the fact that economic theories
are not logically falsifiable by themselves does not constitute a good
argument against falsificationism because they can be incorporated into
logically falsifiable test systems.  But the same argument holds for
theories of practically all disciplines, no matter how ‘unscientific’ they
appear to be.  If one wants to, there is little difficulty in taking any
statement to be  conveniently falsifiable (Hausman, 1988).  Besides,
economists are so little involved with testing because, either many are
involved with non-empirical conceptual work, or, given the subject matter
they deal with, they do not know enough to formulate good tests or to
interpret the results of tests.  It may be possible with discovery of better
experimental techniques and more detailed knowledge (Hausman, 1992).
This line of argument definitely shakes falsificationism to its roots and
opens up the possibility of a plural approach.
Postpositivist tendencies
Bruce Caldwell, in his Beyond Positivism, asks: How are we to
do methodological work in the postpositivist era?  He claims that
falsificationism cannot be a recommendable Methodology since its
structures are extremely demanding.  What he advocates instead is
“methodological pluralism”.  He believes that the primary purpose of
methodological work in economics is to enhance our understanding of
what economic science is all about and, by so doing, to improve it
(Caldwell, 1988).  The critical appraisal of theories plays an essential
role in methodological pluralism.  But criticism is not undertaken for
the purposes of either discovering or applying some universal criterion
of demarcation.  The role of the methodologist, according to Caldwell,
is to discover the strengths and weaknesses of research programmes.
This is of course a different endeavour from searching for a universal10
norm for demarcation and goes beyond what is known as positivist
epistemology.  Against the advice of economists like Caldwell, who have
paid attention to the history of philosophy over the last four decades or
so, economists in general still use the positivist way of arguing.
Interestingly, a naive positivism seems to have given economists the
strength to carry on.  But times are changing, as the editors of a volume
titled The Consequences of Economic Rhetoric have noted.  According
to them, positivism is losing its grip on the collective consciousness of
economists (Klamer, McCloskey and Solow, 1988).  Now the economists
are becoming interested in their language and their rhetorical devices.  It
now seems that, instead of making Methodological pronouncements,
economists can do well if they pay attention to those scholars who have
spent their professional lives thinking, writing, and talking about the
subject.
The implications of postpositivist ideas in the Methodology of
economics have been traced by McCloskey, Klamer, and others.
McCloskey calls attention to the kind of positivism that informs appraisal
of economic practices.  McCloskey shows that the way economic theory
and econometrics “work” is through the use of particular rhetorical
strategies.  For example, McCloskey points out that John Muth’s 1961
article on rational expectations, although written in a formalistic language,
could be translated into simple nonscientistic prose5.  By this McCloskey
5 I have a slight disagreement with McCloskey on this point. While it is true that
some arguments can be translated from formal into non-formal language with
little alteration of the substantive content, this is not always the case. Formalisation
of a theory generally involves isolating some aspects of the theory to produce a
highly idealised representation of it. In this process, the ambiguity of natural
language gives way to clarity and precision, which is a good thing, but these
qualities are gained only at the cost of losing much of the richness of natural
language. Thus translation from one language to another is not without
consequence -- it involves changes in the degrees of precision and richness. Thanks
to Professor Krishnaji for pointing this out to me.11
does not mean that formal language is useless.  The scientific metaphors
Muth uses are indeed necessary for persuading other economists of the
importance of his arguments.  For a serious rhetorician, scientific
metaphors that the mainstream economists extensively use are not mere
frills -- they constitute a serious figure of argument.
Before we move on, it may be worthwhile to clarify certain
ambiguities present in the writings of researchers in economics, who
seem to have been positively influenced by postmodernist thinking in
other social science disciplines. Since most of them are trained primarily
in quantitative techniques, they tend to think that the so-called
‘qualitative’ or ethnographic research methods would free their discipline
from the shackles of positivism6.  While it is true that the grip of positivism
over other social science disciplines is fairly weak, and it is also true that
the qualitative research methods are the most favourite ones among the
practitioners in these disciplines, there is no necessary connection
between the two.  Qualitative research methods can be made consistent
with positivist epistemology. A postpositivist position would instead see
the two approaches as different means of persuasion, without making
any claim of superiority of one over the other.  Adding qualitative
techniques to an economist’s box of tools may produce more persuasive
arguments; or it may not -- it all depends.  The point that we are making
is that it is impossible to know beforehand which methods are going to
prove effective in persuading the members of the community of
economists.  This necessitates the study of their actual practice -- the
study of how they actually persuade each other and the world.  Appraisal
of existing economic literature thus becomes an activity similar to literary
criticism.  Criticising economics in the literary sense of ‘criticism’ does
6 This line of argument is presented in Shome et al (1996), and its refutation can be
found in Chakraborty (1996) on which this paragraph is based.12
not necessarily mean passing judgements on the ‘truth value’ of a
particular piece of work. A criticism is a reading.
This literary turn in criticism of economic writings has
transformed the way we used to think about economic Methodology.
Now we are able to see that the logical structure of economic theories,
criteria of appraisal or objects of study in conventional economic
Methodology, are subsumed in a more comprehensive interpretive
framework.  Logical expressions and “facts” are only two of the many
rhetorical devices that characterise economic discourse.  Other rhetorical
devices such as metaphor or “story” could as well be used to persuade
the audience.  McCloskey has gone a long way in pointing out the ubiquity
of metaphors in economics.  However, we still have much to learn about
how the complex composition of arguments that the most persuasive of
the authors employ to persuade others.
We take a slightly different route from McCloskey’s.  We view
scholars in a particular way in this approach.  They are seen essentially
as social creatures whose aim is to live in a community with others.  The
boundaries of a typical community are in constant flux.  An individual
member of a community always experiences a tension between two
contradictory motives -- solidarity within the community and a desire to
transcend the boundaries.  It is quite easy to see why a member of a
certain community of scholars might feel indignant if a criticism comes
from another community7. We feel that assessment of arguments cannot
be made unless we confront the contexts as particulars.  And they will
best be confronted by a person who is experienced in that interpretive
7 Frank Hahn’s replies to critiques of general equilibrium theory is a case in point.
He seems to be upset by the ‘ignorance’ that his critics display. He devotes his
Cambridge inaugural lecture against Kaldor’s earlier essay on the irrelevance of
general equilibrium theory. See Hahn (1973) and Kaldor (1972).13
community.  Does it mean that such critical work can never come from
someone who does not belong to that community?  Not exactly.  The
idea of methodological conversation does not mean to promote isolation
of one interpretive community from another.  But it is important for an
‘outsider’ to get enough understanding of the language of conversation
within a community.  Conversations in one community can enter in an
integral way in an internal critique in another, since knowledge of
conversational practices (methodology, that is) in community X by
community Y is as much a part of the internal reality of community Y as
it is of community X8.  This awareness is in fact necessary to check the
tendency of narrow, temporary agreement among the members of a
community to give rise to an immutable Methodological dogma.  Both
Sen and Hirschman remind us of the importance of guarding us against
this tendency in economic practice.
Case studies: Albert Hirschman and Amartya Sen
What is common in both Hirschman and Sen is that although
they are anxious to show up inadequacies in existing theories, they are
not typically concerned with replacement of these theories with radically
different alternatives. However, while Sen sees himself “on the whole
as a mainstream economist” (Sen, 1990, p259), trying to make
mainstream economics take more note of such problems as poverty,
famines, women’s question, etc, Hirschman sees himself as a “maverick
who deliberately complicates the economic discourse”.  It seems that
Sen would more or less agree with Kuhn and others who have argued, it
may be necessary for members of a scientific community to proceed as
if the dominant paradigm is true until the time is ripe for its replacement.
8 In an overall cultural context, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen take a similar
position. See Nussbaum, M. and A. Sen (1987).14
And this seems to have worked well for him.  On the reasons for Sen’s
‘deep impact’, Michel De Vroey points out “it is not irrelevant that his
critique of welfarist tradition in social choice theory should come from
someone like him who has also made important positive contributions
to the field and who has thereby earned enough credentials to be allowed
a critical stance, without being dismissed at once” (De Vroey, 1991,
italics ours).  “Positive contributions to the field” is seen as conferring
the right to criticise the field itself.  This is somewhat close to our central
position in this paper, which emphasises the role of what might be called
‘internal criticism’ or appraisal from within, or methodological
conversation.  Since, as we have already noted, there is no independent
(or meta-theoretic) basis for appraisal, an economic theory or an economic
argument is always appraised from within economics.
Hirschman deliberately avoids being identified with any theoretical
tradition in economics. Paradoxically, although in general, economists
want to know which school of thought someone belongs, resisting a
label is also quite common among them. As Klamer points out, a label
may sometimes become important in persuation9. Unlike Sen, Hirschman
may have suffered from an uncertainty in the community of economists
because of his  nebulousness in this regard.
Although Sen’s own approach to the question of Methodology
emphasises “heterogeneity and relevance” (Sen, 1991), it is strongly
grounded on the cumulation of mainstream economic practice.  While
admitting the fact that much of the discontent about the mainstream
9 According to Klamer, this belongs to the category of “meta-arguments”.
“Theoretical, empirical, epistemological, philosophical, commonsense arguments
-- and still that is not all. Economists use even more arguments to sway their
audience and get support for what they have to say. Commonly used tactics are to
distinguish their own approach from others and to appropriate history. Meta
arguments, the formal expression of such tactics, are statements about economists
and their work.”(Klamer, 1983, p249).15
economic theorising is well grounded, he observes that quite a few
critiques seem to take insufficient note of the particular nature of the
exercises under attack.  Some criticisms are based on an inadequate
recognition of the diversity of motivations and concerns underlying
different types of economic theory.  He criticises the narrowness of
prediction-centred Methodological approach on the obvious ground that
there are other exercises - for example doing economic evaluation or
providing adequate description -- which are as important as predictive
theories. Sen makes a further point which is usually overlooked.  As far
as causal theories are concerned, the need to test them with empirical
information is fairly universally accepted in principle by economic
theorists.  But there is a tendency to view testing as an ultimate rather
than an immediate step to be undertaken.
“The complexity of many economic problems requires that
conceptual and analytical issues be explored very
substantially to understand what types of relationships
might be involved. While the analyses at this stage are
not meant for immediate testing and verification, they can
greatly help cognitive assessment of the problems and the
relations under examination.  A great deal of economic
theory involving causal relationships is, in fact, of this
kind” (Sen, 1991, p7 ).
Sen’s own ‘entitlement’ approach to analyses of famines (Sen,
1981) can be seen in this light.  Sen himself said he was offering “a
general framework for analyzing famines rather than one particular
hypothesis about their causation” (ibid, p162).  De Waal (1990) in his
criticism of the entitlement approach labels it as ‘entitlement theory’
and expects it to provide a general theory encompassing all the specific
causes of entitlement failures.  Since the entitlement approach is not a16
model of famine causation or a comprehensive general theory, it is not
meant for immediate testing and verification10.  Sen’s elaborate case
studies of famines are clearly meant for defending his arguments which
he advances to persuade his audience.  And he seems to have achieved
success in this endeavour even though there is no immediate testable
implication (in the strict positivist sense) that follows from his approach.
An approach, because of its very nature, cannot be ‘tested’ in the positivist
sense.  According to Osmani (1995), this approach-view is clearly
presented in Poverty and Famines.
Sen’s special strength lies in his ability to combine lucidity11 and
rigour.  And thus he is able to attract interest far beyond fellow economists.
The success of his book Poverty and Famines, for example, is not
surprising given the appropriate combination of formal language and
incisive case studies, even though it would be fair to say that most of
Sen’s arguments were not really new.  His entitlement approach
essentially extends the concept of the opportunity set in microeconomics,
and the choice of abstract and formalistic style almost naturally follows,
given the nature of his intended audience.  Terms like ‘endowment’,
‘exchange entitlement’, ‘E-mapping’ are clearly aimed at persuading
members of certain language community who are expected to appreciate
the nuances involved in certain ways of conceptualising.  In discussing
such disturbing themes as coexistence of famines and unprecedented
food stocks, too much of moral indignation may not be a good rhetorical
strategy if universities and donor agencies are one’s target audience.  By
choosing an appropriate style, Sen has no doubt achieved more success
than most critics of mainstream economics in influencing audiences.
10 On this and related issues see Gasper (1993).
11 Lucidity in style, we feel, is a matter of taste, rather than an absolute virtue.
Sometimes obscurity plays a pragmatic function in attracting attention of a
contemptuous audience.17
It is meaningless to ask whether Hirschman is more successful
than Sen in influencing others in the discipline.  Both of them have made
significant contributions to the fields of development and economic
theory; and have held some of the most prestigious professorships in the
western academic world.  However, it would be fair to say that over time
Hirschman has somewhat faded from the economics profession’s sight,
even though his recent writings still continue to bear traces of his
skeptical, ironical and incisive cast of mind.  His books have all along
been praised highly by such eminent writers as Kenneth Arrow, John
Galbraith, Charles Lindblom, and the like. At the same time, one does
not fail to notice the increasingly formalistic mainstream economists’
lack of interest in his writings.  This is puzzling, given the admiration
and respect he commands from many of the mainstream economists for
his ‘deep insight’. In what follows, we make an attempt to explain this
apparent puzzle by taking a close look at Hirschman’s style.
Hirschman’s writings are typically characterised by a kind of
“playful seriousness”, a questioning and amused attitude (McPherson,
1986).  As we have already noted, he sees himself as someone who
“deliberately complicates economic discourse”. “Like any virtue”, he
notes, “parsimony in theory construction can be overdone and something
is sometimes to be gained by making things more complicated”.  All the
‘complications’ he wants to introduce in the economic discourse flow
from the “complexity of human nature” which is disregarded by
traditional theory.  He does not, however, forget to add that this disregard
was “for very good reasons”.  This addendum definitely has a pragmatic
function in the art of winning over an audience convinced about the
virtues of what Hirschman is calling ‘traditional theory’.  What he
suggests is that the complications must be “spoonfed” back into the
traditional framework.  McPherson(1986) describes Hirschman’s work
metaphorically as one of “peering around the edges and through the18
cracks in social scientific laws, to see what is being overlooked”. This
feature seems to have pervaded his writings, from his early work on
‘unbalanced growth’ through his recent intervention where he questions
the behavioural foundations of economic theory (Hirschman, 1985). If
McPherson’s portrayal of Hirschman is correct, it at least partially
explains why interest in Hirschman has not been sustained over the years,
especially within the mainstream. The irony is that what McPherson
views as the most remarkable feature of Hirschman’s writing might have
actually hindered spread of his influence. Hirschman himself does not
quite agree with McPherson’s portrayal of him as someone who is
primarily interested in underlining what more systematic-minded
economists have overlooked.  According to him, “skepticism toward
other people’s claims to spectacular theoretical discoveries is, of course,
not a particularly noteworthy trait” (Hirschman, 1994, p278).  To be
fair, one must admit that Hirschman has developed quite a few theoretical
notions of his own, some of which have even found their place in the
textbooks on development. But the very specific way that he does
economics may be seen as responsible for the lack of interest shown by
most of the systematic-minded economists.
Although it appears that both Sen and Hirschman want to strike a
middle ground between opposing views, Hirschman is perhaps a great
deal more, what might be phrased as ‘against method’. When asked about
his method, Hirschman replies “I think it is 80 per cent art and perhaps
20 per cent science or whatever you want to call it” (Swedberg, 1990).
Hirschman’s approach to economic methodology is essentially a logical
extension of his approach to development issues. Hirschman differs from
most of his fellow development economists, both leftists and rightists,
in his position that progress can be achieved without premeditated goals
and without prior knowledge of how to achieve these goals (Sanyal,
1994). Hirschman seems to believe that institutions come to define their19
goals in a more precise way as a result of engaging in action, often without
much knowledge about the possible consequences of their action.  In an
analogous way, one can argue that communities of scientists come to
define their methodological standards as a result of engaging in
conversation. In economics, conversations are often overshadowed by
an apparent conflict between those who advocate rigorous and
parsimonious models of social reality and others who emphasise
pluralistic, narrative, or qualitative descriptions. While Sen takes a middle
position between the two apparently opposing approaches, Hirschman
is often criticised for his “rejection of the drive toward rigour” (Krugman,
1994, p40). In a highly provocative essay Paul Krugman (1994) blames
Hirschman and Myrdal for helping precipitate the fall of what he calls
“high development theory” that had deep influence on both economists
and policy makers in the 1940s and 1950s. Krugman attributes it entirely
to their stylistic and methodological stance. He writes,
Until their (i.e. Hirschman’s and Myrdal’s) books
appeared, economists doing high development theory were
trying to be good mainstream economists. They could not
develop full formal models, but they got as close as they
could, trying to keep up with the increasingly model-
oriented mainstream. Myrdal and Hirschman abandoned
this effort, and eventually took stands on principle against
any effort to formalize their ideas. (Krugman, 1994, p 47)
Let us reiterate again, we are interested here not so much in what
Hirschman wrote, although that certainly is important, but in how he
made his ideas persuasive. What kinds of arguments does he prefer to
deploy?  What comes out of Krugman’s indictment is that Hirschman’s
stylistic stance must have played a crucial role in his limited impact on20
the mainstream economists.  If economists are not persuaded, who is his
implied reader then?  Hirschman writes,
The fundamental bent of my writings has been to widen
the limits of what is or is perceived to be possible, be it at
the cost of lowering our ability, real or imaginary, to discern
the probable. The nature of these persistent widening
attempts -- or what I shall call my “possibilism” -- varies
with the public I am addressing. (Hirschman, 1971, italics
added).
What is to be noted here is that the nature of his possibilism varies
with the public he is addressing.  Clearly, he wants to maintain what
might be called “cultural sensitivity”, a sensitivity toward the culture of
conversation of a community.  But does one see a consistently defined
audience in Hirschman’s writing? That he is primarily an economist is
evident. He has written extensively on the behaviour of firms and the
functioning of national economies. The conceptual apparatus he often
chooses to explain various issues on development belong largely to the
discipline of economics. To a large extent Hirschman’s use of the
conceptual categories familiar to economists can be explained by his
desire to communicate with other economists. As Sanyal observes,
Hirschman is “an economist at heart, in that his ‘natural’ inclination is
to explain any social phenomenon by drawing an analogy with the
functioning of the market”. But his preference for tools familiar to
economists does not produce in him any sympathy toward what is
pejoratively called “economic imperialism”, that is, the practice of using
economic tools to explain non-economic phenomena. In Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty, he makes his position clear against using “the tools of one
discipline for the purpose of annexing another”.  The economist has
typically assumed that dissatisfaction with an organisation’s product is21
met by withdrawal of demand (‘exit’), while the political scientist thinks
rather of the protests possible within the organisation (‘voice’).
Hirschman argues that a comparative analysis of these two options and
their interplay is likely to enrich both the disciplines.
Sen too is not very sympathetic to the so-called economic models
of non-economic behaviour, as epitomised by Gary Becker’s work. Both
Sen and Hirschman hold more or less similar views on how to make
cross-disciplinary communication without “imperialism” of any kind.
If Sen takes up the task of building bridges between ethics and economics,
Hirschman focuses on the connection between economics and politics
in a novel way. In spite of these similarities, it is quite evident that they
have very different kinds of impact on the academic community. The
difference, we feel, is largely due to their stylistic and methodological
preferences.
On a felicitation note Philippe Van Parijs comments,
“Sen is one of the very few people who are able to convey
to economists, in a language they find congenial, those
philosophical insights which they would be naive to ignore
in discussing even the most concrete policy questions.  He
is also one of the very few people who are able to explain
to philosophers, in a language they can understand, those
elements of economic conversation which they would
otherwise neglect.” (van Parijs, 1990, italics ours).
Sen makes similar attempts elsewhere too. An extensive literature
in development economics has grown since the 1970s that draws attention
to neglected aspects of development such as quality of life, the fulfillment
of basic needs, and so on.  But welfare theorists typically sneer at these
writings and treat them as nothing more than a bunch of ad-hoc22
suggestions.  This attitude is perhaps due to their Methodological belief
that statements or suggestions should not just appeal to intuitions but
also be structured and founded.  Sen attributes this gulf between
development economists and welfare theorists to the different modes of
arguing that are used by the respective communities.  In this context Sen
makes an attempt to bridge another kind of gap, the gap between welfare
theory and development economics.  Instead of privileging one mode of
argument over the other in an essentialist sense, he suggests that we
have to compare and contrast the foundational features underlying the
concern with quality of life, basic needs etc. with the informational
foundations of the more traditional approaches used in welfare economics
and moral philosophy, such as utilitarianism (Sen, 1984).
Hirschman observes that economists continue to identify scientific
progress with the elimination of “exogenous” factors from their
constructs, while political scientists use political categories only to explain
political events.  He takes up the “decentralised” activity of building
bridges between economics and politics. One imagines that this must be
an extremely useful way of looking at various social phenomena. But
what sets Hirschman apart from Sen is the former’s impatience with the
formal language that economists use in models. As a matter of fact, a
kind of ambivalence surrounds Hirschman’s attitude toward formal tools
in economics. According to the perspectives of internal criticism set forth
in the last section, one must take sufficient note of the language of
conversation pertaining to existing theories which one attempts to
question and modify. Hirschman’s modifications often take the form of
a combination of suggestive metaphor, anecdotes and analogies. We are
not suggesting that metaphor has less epistemic status than models set in
mathematical language. In fact, mathematical models are metaphors,
and there is nothing defeatist in it if a modeler says so. What we want to
emphasise instead is that in a community of academic economists, who23
more or less agree on the persuasiveness of theoretical arguments set in
mathematical models because of their repeated use, it is perhaps not a
good strategy to use a language which is far removed from the
practitioners of “normal science”.
Concluding remarks: Towards a more tolerant critical culture
Rejection of a meta-theoretic perspective in economic
methodology is likely to facilitate better communication among
practitioners in social sciences in general and economics in particular.
In spite of their differences on the need for formalism in economics,
both Sen and Hirschman have shown their deep commitment against
dogma, and they are remarkable in commanding admiration and respect
from their fellow social scientists with a variety of intellectual
orientations.  “The typical economist”, McCloskey writes, is harshly if
unreflectively dogmatic, demanding that students or colleagues be
members in good standing of this or that church...Simple-mindedness
accentuates dogmatism” (McCloskey, 1994).  As Sen notes, “our ability
to misrepresent or misunderstand what others are upto is quite striking”
(Sen, 1991).  Sen’s exquisite courtesy and respect for people who hold
different views has in fact proven most productive in defence of his
ideas.  Separateness of large groups of citizens from one another seems
to Hirschman too worrisome.  He dramatises his point by saying “each
group will at some point ask about the other, in utter puzzlement and
often with mutual revulsion, “How did they get to be that way?””
(Hirschman, 1991).  It is not rare to see economists using Methodology
as a stick to beat up the members of the larger community.24
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